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Abstract: 
We show that Rand et al. (2012) and Rand et al. (2014)—who argue that cooperation is 
intuitive—provide an incorrect interpretation of their own data. They make the mistake of 
inferring intuition from relative decision times alone, without taking into account absolute 
decision times. We re-examine their data and find that the vast majority of their responses are 
slow, exceeding four seconds, even in time-pressure treatments intended to promote intuitive 
responses. Further, a plot of the average cooperation rates by decision time presents no clear 
relationship between decision time and cooperation. However, among the few decisions that 
were relatively fast (less than four seconds), there appears to be a positive—not negative—
correlation between decision time and cooperation. We conclude that the data presented by 
Rand et al. (2012) and Rand et al. (2014) fail to provide evidence for the hypothesis that 
cooperation is intuitive. If anything, their data indicate the opposite. 
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1. Introduction 
In their paper entitled “Spontaneous giving and calculated greed,” Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012) 
argue that cooperation is the product of intuition and greed of deliberation. The premise for their 
analysis is that intuition is fast, but deliberation slow. Their conclusion—that “our first impulse is to 
cooperate” (p. 429)—is based on two empirical patterns from public good games: that (1) the degree 
of cooperation is negatively associated with decision times, and (2) inducing faster decision times 
causes more cooperation. A re-examination of their data, however, reveals that their conclusions about 
the relationship between intuition and cooperation are mistaken. The authors infer intuition from 
relative decision times alone—which are all slow—without documenting the presence of very fast 
decision times, of which there are virtually none. Any inference about the role of intuition over 
deliberation in shaping cooperative behavior, however, would require that we establish the presence of 
very fast decisions—to rule out deliberation. Otherwise, differences in decision times may simply 
reflect differences in consciously controlled deliberation times, which have little bearing on whether a 
particular decision is intuitive, in the meaning spontaneous or automatic. 
 We organize our critique into three parts. First, we consider the data and the claims from Rand 
et al. (2012), which pioneered the study of decision times and cooperation. We show that the manner 
in which the authors present their evidence does not allow the conclusions drawn. Second, we consider 
the additional data provided by Rand, Peysakhovich, Kraft-Todd, Newman, Wurzbacher, Nowak, and 
Greene (2014). They allegedly included all studies completed by the research group on this subject. 
Here, too, we show that the manner in which the authors present the evidence does not allow the 
conclusions drawn. Third, we consider alternative approaches to the data. These, however, also fail to 
provide evidence for the hypothesis that cooperation is a spontaneous response. In fact, it would be 
more appropriate to claim some evidence for the opposite conclusion.  
 
2. No evidence of spontaneous cooperation in Rand et al. (2012) 
The crux of Rand et al.’s (2012) argument is that individuals, who were assigned to experimental 
treatments that were intended to reduce decision times, contributed more than did those assigned to 
treatments intended to raise decision times. The authors use two different manipulations to influence 
decision times: (a) time pressure treatments, in Studies 6 and 7, and (b) conceptual priming treatments, 
in Studies 8 and 9. However, median decision times in the time pressure treatments are 10 seconds in 
both studies, far exceeding any reasonable threshold for conscious processing, which would be in the 
hundreds of milliseconds (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Posner et al., 1998). Neither of the time 
pressure treatments yield a sizeable portion of fast responses. In Study 6, a mere 2.87 percent of the 
responses in the time-pressure treatment were made in less than four seconds. In Study 7, none 
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responded within four seconds in the time pressure treatment. Thus, although participants in the time 
pressure treatments did decide quicker than did participants in the time delay treatments (median 
decision times of 22 and 21 seconds in studies 6 and 7, respectively), and although cooperation in the 
former is also higher than cooperation in the latter (study 6: means = $0.23 vs. $0.22, t(678) = -1.62, p 
= 0.107; study 7: means = $1.98 vs. $1.63, t(209) = -1.61, p = 0.108),  there is no evidence of 
spontaneous decisions in the time pressure treatments.1 Hence, we may not infer—as the authors do—
that the intuitive response, in the meaning spontaneous or automatic, is to cooperate. The observed 
differences in cooperation may result from differences in degree and type of consciously controlled 
deliberations inasmuch as from differences in spontaneous versus deliberative choices.      
The same can be said for the treatment that attempted to prime intuitive processing in Study 9, 
with a median response time of 9 seconds and a mere 1.63 percent of decisions reported in less than 
four seconds. However, it is worth noting that their conceptual priming manipulation did not influence 
decision times; mean decision times for the intuitive and deliberative treatments (13.0 and 13.7 
seconds, respectively) were statistically indistinguishable (t(252) = 0.35,  p = 0.730). Rand et al. 
(2012) fail to mention the absence of an effect of the priming manipulation on decision times—even 
though they use the higher cooperation rate in the intuitive treatment (means = $0.26 vs. $0.23; t(254) 
= -1.67, p = 0.096) as evidence for their claim that cooperation is the intuitive response. Study 8 also 
reported a higher cooperation rate in the intuitive treatment (means = $0.26 vs. $0.21, t(341) =-2.44, p 
=0.015), but the decision time data for this study are not available.2 
The second type of evidence presented as support for the proposition that cooperation is the 
intuitive response, is correlational—that decision times are negatively associated with cooperation. 
Rand et al. (2012) present negative correlations for Studies 1-5.3 However, as with the experimental 
treatments intended to influence decision times, the correlational evidence is of little value to their 
proposition in the absence of very fast decisions. Among Rand et al.'s studies for which decision times 
are publicly available (all, except 8), there is not one that yields a substantial portion of decisions close 
to the consciousness threshold. In fact, the share of decisions recorded within four seconds ranges 
from 0% (Study 7) to 2.76% (Study 9). Most decisions are slow, allowing ample time to deliberate. 
Hence, without evidence of decisions so fast that deliberation would be implausible, we cannot rule 
out differences in consciously controlled deliberation as the source of the correlation. 
 
                                                          
1 The mean differences in cooperation are statistically significant when the comparison is confined to 
participants who obeyed the time constraints (Study 6: means = $0.27 vs. $0.22, t(415) = -3.47, p < 0.001; Study 
7: means = $2.31 vs. $1.69, t(149) = -2.35, p = 0.020).  
2 In November, 2014, we requested the decision time data for Study 8 from the corresponding author of Rand et 
al. (2012), but we have to date received no response.  
3 Study 1 is presented in the main body of Rand et al. (2012), whereas Studies 2-5 are presented in the 
Supplementary Section.  
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3. No evidence of spontaneous cooperation in Rand et al. (2014) 
In response to the failed replication by Tinghög et al. (2013), Rand et al. (2013) refer to new data, 
later published by Rand et al. (2014), to reinforce their conclusion that cooperation is spontaneous. 
Rand et al. (2014) pool data from all time pressure studies carried out by their research group, 
including Rand et al. (2012), yielding a total of 6913 decisions, across 15 studies. All studies, except 
F, feature one-shot games. However, this substantial data set tells the same story as that told by Rand 
et al. (2012). Median decision times in the time pressure treatments of one-shot games range from 6 
seconds (Studies J, K, M, N, and O) to 13 (Study B), and none yield a large portion of decisions close 
the consciousness threshold. The share of decisions recorded within four seconds ranges from 0% 
(Study D) to 8.67% (Study M). 
 Pooling all their data, we may examine the distribution of decisions across decision times, and 
plot the average contributions for each one-second interval (see Figure 1, plot a and b, respectively). In 
their pooled sample across studies A to O, the vast majority (92.63%) used four seconds or more to 
make a decision. Moreover, a striking result appears in Figure 1, plot b): there is no clear relationship 
between decision times and contributions. The pooled data set yields no correlation between decision 
times and contributions (ρ = -0.0043, n = 6830, p = 0.723). However, among those who used less than 
four seconds, the correlation is positive and significant (ρ = 0.4134, n = 504, p < 0.001). A positive 
correlation between cooperation and decision-time is preserved for every threshold up to and including 
12 seconds. 
 
Figure 1a here 
Figure 1b here 
 
 In sum, the data presented by Rand et al. (2012) and Rand et al. (2014) do not allow the 
inference that cooperation is intuitive and greed calculated. Rather, most decision makers take their 
time, and the few who do not cooperate less. 
 
4. Alternative approaches to the data in Rand et al. (2014) 
Rand et al. (2014) present data from a variety of economic games, including dictator games, trust 
games, prisoner’s dilemma games,  and public good games—the latter both one-shot and repeated with 
random-matching. Restricting our analysis to the one-shot public good games, which constitute 78 
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percent of their observations, may provide a clearer perspective on the relation between cooperation 
and decision times.  
We start our examination of one-shot public good games by examining mean cooperation rates 
by decision time. The proposition that cooperation is spontaneous would require that cooperation fall 
in the first few seconds—when impulse gives to deliberation. As we can see from Figure 2, there is no 
meaningful comparison to be made of one- versus two-second decisions, as only two decisions were 
made in one second. However, cooperation increases from seconds 2 to 3, albeit non-significantly, 
when decision times are rounded to the nearest second. A more powerful test would be to compute the 
correlation between cooperation and raw decision times, with an upward restriction at four seconds. 
Doing so yields in fact a positive and significant correlation (ρ = 0.2004, n = 102, p = 0.043). 
Although across the entire sample the correlation between decision times and cooperation is negative 
and significant (ρ = -0.1072, n = 4574, p < 0.001), the absence of a negative correlation within the first 
few seconds prohibits the inference that the former correlation implies spontaneous cooperation. In 
other words, there is no evidence from this analysis that cooperation is more spontaneous than is non-
cooperation. 
 
Figure 2a here 
Figure 2b here 
 
 Should we instead examine the likelihood that a given response contributes everything to the 
public good, the case for spontaneous cooperation fares no better. Restricting our analysis again to 
decisions made in less than four seconds, the likelihood that a given response contributes everything 
increases with decision time (probit regression: coefficient = 0.426, n = 102, p = 0.095). As with 
average contribution rates, we find here too that the likelihood of contributing everything is negatively 
correlated with decision time when all decision times are included (probit regression: coefficient = -
0.005, n = 4574, p = 0.006)—but the presence of a positive correlation within the first few seconds 
prohibits the inference that the former correlation implies spontaneous cooperation.  
 An alternative approach would be to examine the likelihood that a given response equally splits 
the endowment, contributing half to the public good. However, there is no discernable relationship 
between decision times and the likelihood of choosing an equal split, neither within the first four 
seconds (probit regression: coefficient = 0.196, n = 102, p = 0.523) nor across the entire range of 
decision times (probit regression: coefficient = 0.001, n = 4574, p = 0.220). 
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 Finally, we revisit our original criticism—that the vast majority of allocation decisions in Rand 
et al. (2014) are relatively slow—by considering the one study for which the share of fast decisions 
was the greatest, namely Study F. Study F is a repeated public good game with random matching, for 
which median decision times are 2 seconds and 13 seconds in the time pressure and time delay 
treatments, respectively. 42.64% of the total 720 decisions were recorded at less than four seconds. 
However, within this range, the correlation between decision times and cooperation is positive and 
significant (ρ = 0.2846, n = 307, p < 0.001). This would contradict claims that intuition promotes 
cooperation. Of course, by virtue of its structure, there could be learning across rounds, and we know 
from past studies that cooperation tends to drop with rounds (e.g., Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). It 
might be possible, then, that the positive correlation is driven by more reflexively uncooperative 
behavior in later rounds.4 However, a regression of contributions on decision times, less than four 
seconds, still yields a positive association between contributions and decision times when we include 
dummies for each round, and robust standard errors, clustered on IP address (tobit regression: 
coefficient = 0.632, n = 307, p = 0.042). It would seem then, that if any conclusion should be drawn 
from the scarce data on fast decision times in Rand et al. (2014), it would be that non-cooperative 
behavior appears more spontaneous.  
 
5. General Discussion 
We have re-examined the data presented by Rand et al. (2012) and Rand et al. (2014), and we have 
found no meaningful evidence that cooperative behavior is more spontaneous or "intuitive" than is 
non-cooperative behavior. Our findings therefore undercut the central message conveyed by the 
authors in these papers—as well their response to failed replications of their pattern of results 
(Tinghög et al., 2013; Rand et al., 2013). A precondition for claiming cooperative behavior is more 
spontaneous—either on the basis of time-pressure manipulations or correlations—is that the data 
contain a sizeable portion of very fast decisions, and that it is variation in these very fast decisions that 
drives time-pressure effects or correlations. The authors do not report the distribution of decisions 
across decision times, but their high median decision times—which they do report—hint that there 
would be few fast decisions. This we have proven to be the case. That the vast majority of responses 
were slow invites the interpretation that they were done under deliberation, and—even if they were 
not—it would be impossible to discriminate between slow intuitive responses and responses that were 
deliberative. On the basis of their entire sample, therefore, we would conclude that their data do not 
permit attributions of cooperative behavior to spontaneous or intuitive processes. 
                                                          
4 Rand et al. make this argument in their unpublished response to an earlier, shorter version of this paper, which 
was submitted to Nature and rejected. 
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  Given the data presented by Rand et al. (2014), which allegedly included all the data collected 
by the research group on this topic, the best possible test for the proposition that cooperative behavior 
is spontaneous would be to examine decisions for those who decided within the first few seconds. Of 
course, there are problems with interpreting such results, as this selection of the sample represents a 
minor portion of the overall sample, and because participants may have made their decision while 
reading the instructions, prior to viewing the decision screen, where the clock starts. However, this 
analysis would allow us to observe the pattern of responses in a range for which intuition plausibly 
might give way to deliberation. If, among those who decide fast—say within four seconds—decision 
times were negatively correlated with cooperation, this would be consistent with the proposition that 
cooperation is spontaneous. However, should instead decision times within this range be positively 
correlated with cooperation, this would be evidence against that hypothesis. Indeed, when including 
responses from the full range of studies presented in Rand et al. (2014), we find that decision times, 
within the first four seconds, are positively correlated with cooperation. This result is preserved when 
we confine the analysis to Study F, which among the 15 studies contains the greatest share of fast 
decisions. When we instead only consider one-shot public good games, we also find a positive trend, 
although not statistically significant. Taken together, these results all speak against the notion that 
cooperative behavior is intuitive. 
 More broadly, it is natural to ask what we can learn about cooperation in general from the 
substantial amount of data—15 studies and 6913 observations—presented in Rand et al. (2014). And 
to do so we should place the studies in some context. In the one-shot public good games, the mean 
cooperation rate is 60 percent of the total endowment. This is substantially higher than mean 
cooperation rates commonly reported for such games; typical cooperation rates range between 30 and 
40 percent (see e.g., Zelmer, 2003; Chaudhuri, 2011). If we instead consider the proportion of players 
contributing everything to the public good, we reach similar conclusions. The proportion of players 
contributing everything in Rand et al. (2014) is 39 percent. In contrast, the proportion of players 
contributing everything in laboratory studies carried out by Kocher et al. (2008) is 8, 11, and 17 
percent—in the US, Japan, and Austria, respectively.5 These discrepancies are not surprising in light 
of the trivial endowment size—40 cents—for all but 211 of Rand et al.’s 4655 observations for one-
shot public good games. Notably, the mean cooperation rate for the aforementioned 211 observations 
(from Study D), which involved more substantial endowments (four dollars), is 45 percent. In fact, 
Amir et al. (2012) report that cooperation rates in online hypothetical public good games do not differ 
from online games with one-dollar endowments; they find that the mean cooperation rate in both cases 
is 68 percent. Hence, there is reason to think that vast majority of observations for one-shot public 
good games in Rand et al. (2014) may be regarded as virtually non-incentivized. It is ironic that Rand 
et al. (2014) base their claims about cooperation on studies that largely feature trivial stakes—when 
                                                          
5 These proportions are not reported in Kocher et al. (2008), but can be found in the original data. 
 8 
their very own opening remarks speak of, "Cooperation, where individuals pay costs to benefit 
others..." (p. 2). 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1 | Few decisions are fast, and within the first four seconds cooperation increases.  
Decision times are rounded to the nearest whole second, and the horizontal axis is truncated at 30 
seconds. (1a) Frequency of decisions by second. Median decision time is 12 seconds. (1b) Mean 
cooperation rate and 95% confidence interval by second. Contribution significantly increases up to the 
fourth second. The figure is based on all decisions for which decision times are available in Rand et al. 
(2014). 
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Second 
(1a) Rand et al. (2014). Pooled data: all studies 
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Second 
(1b) Rand et al. (2014). Pooled data: all studies 
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Figure 2 | Few decisions are fast, and there is no clear pattern between mean cooperation rate 
and decision time.  Decision times are rounded to the nearest whole second, and the horizontal axis is 
truncated at 30 seconds. (1a) Frequency of decisions by second for decisions. Median decision time is 
13 seconds. (1b) Mean cooperation rate and 95% confidence interval by second. The figure is based 
on all decisions made in one-shot public goods games for which data is available in Rand et al. (2014). 
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Second 
(2a) Rand et al. (2014): All one-shot public goods games 
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Second 
(2b) Rand et al. (2014): All one-shot public goods games 
